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Abstract
In this article we examine how Pacific Island Countries (pics) successfully champi-
oned a stand-alone Ocean Sustainable Development Goal (sdg) goal at the United 
Nations (un). We analyse how the un Post-2015 development process provided pics 
with a unique opportunity to use their experience with collective diplomacy and re-
gional oceans governance to propose this international goal. In this article we establish 
how pics’ national and regional quest to strengthen their sovereign rights over marine 
resources motivated their diplomatic efforts for an Ocean sdg. The campaign was a 
significant political achievement, positioning these Large Ocean Island States (lois) as 
global ocean guardians. We critically evaluate the effectiveness of the pics’ diplomatic 
campaign to secure an international commitment for an Ocean sdg. The pics’ advo-
cacy for Goal 14 under Agenda 2030 has enhanced their political effectiveness in the un 
by improving their recognition by other States as leaders in oceans governance. We sug-
gest their Ocean sdg campaign forms part of a distinct and continuing brand of oceans 
diplomacy from Oceania.
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I Introduction
The United Nations sdgs aim to build on the Millennium Development Goals 
(mdgs) and provide a pathway to reconcile human development within 
 ecological limits.1 Global drivers of environmental change like climate change, 
ocean acidification and biodiversity loss threaten Oceania’s marine  ecosystems.2 
The oceans are integral to the economy, diverse cultures and food security of 
 Pacific Islanders. The deteriorating health of marine ecosystems demands a 
new system of international cooperation toward improved governance of ocean 
 resources. In this article we analyse the successful diplomatic campaign by Paci-
fic Island Countries (pics) for Goal 14 ‘to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, 
seas and marine resources for sustainable development’ under Transforming 
Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030).3
pics consider an Ocean sdg an advance on the international support and 
attention lacking under the mdgs for global ocean issues crucial to protecting 
the economic value of their marine resources.4 Global environmental change 
demands a re-evaluation of the governance architecture responsible for the 
global drivers of deleterious environmental change. As the dominant forces for 
ecosystem degradation lie beyond Oceania,5 the inclusion of all States under 
Agenda 2030 provides a unique opportunity to address these global drivers. 
This article demonstrates the significance of the pic diplomatic campaign for 
1 D Griggs, et al, ‘Sustainable development Goals for People and Planet’ (2013) 495:7441 Nature 
305–307, at 305.
2 Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, et al, ‘Coral Reefs under Rapid Climate Change and Ocean Acidifica-
tion’ (2007) 318:5857 Science 1737–1742, at 1741.
3 General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, A/res/70/1 (25 September 2015), at 23.
4 pifsa, ‘Forum Communiqué, Annex B Palau Declaration on “The Ocean: Life and Future”: 
Charting a course to sustainability’ (presented at 45th Pacific Island Forum, Koror, 29–31 July 
2014), at 1.
5 Hendrik Selles, ‘The Relative Impact of Countries on Global Natural Resource Consumption 
and Ecological Degradation’ (2013) 20:2 International Journal of Sustainable Development & 
World Ecology, 97–108, at 98.
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an Ocean sdg at the un to improve the governance of ocean ecological sys-
tems for Oceania and the global community.
This article establishes the pic campaign for an Ocean sdg as part of a co-
ordinated multilateral foreign policy for strengthened sovereign rights over 
marine natural resources. Their campaign for an Ocean sdg under the un 
 post-2015 development agenda presents a transformational shift from the 
 terrestrial and aid for development focus of the mdgs. We demonstrate how 
the success of the pic campaign has empowered pics political engagement 
at the un. This has occurred through their re-identification from Small Island 
Developing States (sids) to Large Ocean Island States (lois), reassertion of 
maritime guardianship as traditional custodians of vast oceanscapes, and as 
contemporary  leaders in oceans governance at the regional scale. We suggest 
the pics’ regional solidarity and effective advocacy for Goal 14 under Agenda 
2030 forms part of a distinct and continuing brand of oceans diplomacy from 
Oceania.
In section ii we examine the historical and contemporary challenges to sov-
ereign control of marine natural resources in Oceania. Section iii follows with 
how their collective diplomacy evolved to meet the challenge global environ-
mental interdependence presented to the traditional legal order of sovereign 
supremacy. Section iv examines the operation of oceanscape-scale gover-
nance frameworks in the establishment of regional positions in global oceans 
governance. Section V documents the power asymmetries with external states 
and the importance of strengthening sovereign control over marine natural 
resources in the context of the Pacific tuna fishery. Section vi analyses the 
operation and influence of pic collective diplomacy to the un in their cam-
paign for a stand-alone Ocean sdg in the post-2015 development process. 
Section vii considers approaches from existing and emerging areas of envi-
ronmental law in a reflection on Goal 14’s capacity to achieve the pic aim of 
preserving ocean ecosystem integrity. In section viii we propose the unity 
of Pacific sids on ocean issues is sourced from a shared Oceanian identity. 
In conclusion, we use these sections of the article to demonstrate collective 
 diplomacy for an Ocean sdg was significant for pics, positioning these coun-
tries as global marine stewards to increase their influence in un negotiations.
II Sovereign Control of Marine Resources in Oceania
Global environmental interdependence requires States to find new diplomat-
ic solutions to balance their sovereign rights and international duties for the 
governance of ocean resources. Globalization through trade, investment and 
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aid create linkages through which state and non-state actors exert significant 
control and influence over negotiations on the exploitation of marine natural 
resources. Kerr and Wiseman define sovereignty as:6
The condition whereby a state claims ultimate legal authority over de-
fined territory and the right to represent the people of that territory in 
the international community. It is the extent to which a polity is under 
no external pressure from other political entities regarding any aspect of 
its behaviour or decision making.
Power asymmetries between pics and these state and non-state actors have 
undermined the sovereign legal authority of these polities by influencing deci-
sions about the use of marine natural resources within their territory.7
For Pacific Island Countries and Territories (picts) foreign incursions and 
exploitation of adjacent marine natural resources undermined the ideal and 
promise of sovereign authority and equality under the 1954 un Charter.8 These 
incursions challenged the ability of picts to secure and protect their sur-
rounding marine natural resources. Securing and extending sovereign rights 
over marine natural resources was a key aspiration of picts.9 The 1962 unga 
resolution on the permanent sovereignty over natural resources10 was impor-
tant for picts who sought emancipation from exploitation of marine natural 
resources at odds with their national interests.
The delimitation of a States marine sovereign space was fundamental to 
picts control over adjacent marine resources and a challenge for attempts to 
codify an international instrument to govern the oceans. The maritime space is 
vital to international peace and security and the functioning of the global eco-
system. The immense potential for international cooperation through a united 
approach to oceans governance was realised with the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 1982 (losc).
6 Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, Diplomacy in a Globalizing World, (Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at 358.
7 Stewart Firth, ‘The Pacific Islands and the Globalization Agenda’ (2000) 12(1) The Contem-
porary Pacific, 177–192, at 177.
8 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 unts xvi, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html [un Charter], Art 2(1).
9 Tuiloma Neroni Slade, ‘Making of International Law: The Role of Small Island States’, 
(2003) 17 The Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 531–544, at 535.
10 General Assembly Resolution 1803 (xvii), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 
a/5217 / 17 un gaor Supp (No17) (14 December 1962), at 15.
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The losc was negotiated and adopted by the third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea (unclos iii 1973–1982) which coincided with an 
intense period of decolonization in Oceania. During unclos iii pics advocat-
ed for the acquisition of extensive sovereign rights over non-living and living 
marine resources.11 The final text accorded pics with substantial agency over 
their marine resources through an eez to 200nm.12 The declared  maritime area 
within the Pacific Island Region represents approximately 30 percent of the 
global area under national jurisdiction.13 The losc recognises the sovereign 
rights of coastal states “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources” and to “determine the allowable catch of 
the living resources” in their eez.14
Despite their diverse stages of development and decolonization, picts’ 
remain alike in their continuing vulnerability to and direction by the power 
configuration of outside forces.15 The liberty and power that had characterised 
sovereign states was a key aspiration of campaigns for independence across 
Oceania. However, in Oceania the emancipation from colonial rule coincided 
with a shift from a State-based system of global governance to the increasing 
authority of non-government institutions and corporate and civil non-govern-
ment organisations in determining the global order. pics face these new poten-
tial challengers to their natural resource sovereignty with the interdependent 
threats of food security and environmental degradation. Section v examines the 
impacts of these power asymmetries in the context of the regional tuna fishery.
III Collective Oceans Diplomacy
Collective oceans diplomacy can best be understood in the context of the 
historical political settlement for Oceania’s premier regional organisation, 
11 Michael Powles, ‘Making Waves in the Big Lagoon: The Influence of Pacific Island Forum 
Countries in the United Nations’ (2002) 2 Revue Juridique Polynesienne, 59–76, at 60.
12 Anthony Bergin, ‘Political and Legal Control over Marine Living Resources-Recent Devel-
opments in South Pacific Distant Water Fishing’ (1994) 9 International Journal of Marine 
& Coastal Law, 289–310, at 289.
13 Andrew Wright, Natasha Stacey and Paula Holland, ‘The Cooperative Framework for 
Ocean and Coastal Management in the Pacific Islands: Effectiveness, Constraints and Fu-
ture Direction’, (2006) 49:9 Ocean & Coastal Management, 739–763, at 740.
14 unclos, Arts 56 & 61.
15 Stephen Levine, ‘The Experience of Sovereignty in the Pacific: Island States and Political 
Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century’, (2012) 50:4 Commonwealth & Comparative Poli-
tics, 439–455, at 445–446.
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the Pacific Island Forum (Forum). In 1971 the organisation was formed to 
address the inequalities and limits on political discussions undermining the self- 
determination of pics, and the Pacific Territories straining for their indepen-
dence from colonial powers.16 Members of the Forum were required to have 
attained independence from colonial powers for admission and its member-
ship evolved with the increasing number of decolonised pics. The Forum 
worked to serve the developing countries and strengthen regional integration, 
and matured into a forum for collective diplomacy.17
pics were among the first architects of formal oceans governance at the 
regional scale. At unclos iii, pics advocated as a group18 for regional ar-
rangements under the law of the sea.19 Reflecting on the informal composite 
negotiating text20 during unclos iii a number of academics advocated for 
the benefits of a regional approach to the law of the sea.21 Janis identified the 
historical, geographical accord for and mutual political, economic and secu-
rity benefits of regional cooperation in matters pertaining to the law of the 
sea.22 Of further relevance for Oceania, regional coordination of legal claims 
improved cooperation within the region and increase the group’s influence in 
their dealing with states outside their region.23
At the 1976 Forum pics recognised the benefits of regional coordination and 
agreed to consult with one another in the establishment of their 200nm eez, 
harmonise fisheries policy across the region and cooperate in negotiations 
16 Greg Fry, ‘Recapturing the Spirit of 1971: Towards a New Regional Political Settlement in the 
Pacific’ (Discussion Paper State, Society & Governance in Melanesia Program anu 2014).
17 Grey Fry and Sandra Tarte, The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press, 2015), at 48.
18 The Oceania Group was an informal regional group within in unclos consisting of 
 Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga, and Western Samoa.
19 Fredrick L Ramp, ‘Regional Law of the Sea: A Proposal for the Pacific’, (1977) 18 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, at 121.
20 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text, a/conf.62/wp.10 (15 July 1977).
21 Mark W Janis, ‘Roles of Regional Law of the Sea’, (1975) 12:3 San Diego Law Review, at 553; 
Michael Hardy, ‘Regional Approaches to Law of the Sea Problems: The European Com-
munity’, (1975) 24:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 336–348; Robert B 
Krueger and Myron H Nordquist, ‘Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone: 
State Practice in the Pacific Basin’ (1978) 19 Virginia Journal of International Law, at 321; 
Lewis M Alexander, ‘Regional Arrangements in the Oceans’, (1977) 71 American Journal of 
International Law, at 84.
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with external fishing states.24 This demonstrates the responsiveness of pics to 
the power asymmetries with external states for their claims on marine natural 
resources. pics advocacy for regional arrangements under the law of the sea 
and multilateral collaboration for a regional fishing policy were early diplo-
matic tactics to enhance their sovereign rights over marine natural resources.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (unhce) 1972 
was important in recognising the interlinkages between the environment and 
development and articulating the global environmental responsibility for the 
protection of the environment.25 This responsibility challenged the traditional 
legal order of sovereign supremacy to acknowledge, adapt and evolve to pre-
vent further environmental damage.26 Together the pics responded with the 
development of a regional governance instrument the Convention on Conser-
vation of Nature in the South Pacific 1976. The pics were also early architects 
of a regional instrument under the unep Regional Seas Programme with the 
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of 
the South Pacific Region (1986).27 Rochette et al and Warner, Gjerde and Free-
stone also endorse a regional approach as an important means to address the 
fragmented coordination of oceans governance.28
Cicin-Sain and Knecht, Van Dyke and Osmundsun consider efforts to meet 
obligations under the losc through regional instruments, such as the Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South 
Pacific Region (1986), contribute to form a new regional regime for oceans 
governance in Oceania.29 The next section analyses the newest regional 
24 South Pacific Forum, Forum Communiqué, Nauru, 26 - 28 July 1976, at 8; R Kearney, ‘The 
Law of the Sea and Regional Fisheries Policy’ (South Pacific Commission Occasional 
Paper No 2, 1977).
25 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, a/Conf.48/14/Rev (16 June 1972).
26 Susan H Bragdon, ‘National Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility: Can 
the Tension be Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological Diversity’, (1992) 33:2 Har-
vard International Law Journal, 381–392, at 384.
27 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific 
Region, adopted 24 November 1986 (entered into force 22 August 1990).
28 Robin Warner, K Gjerde, and David Freestone, ‘Regional Governance for Fisheries and 
Biodiversity’, in sm Garcia, J Rice and A Charles (eds), Governance of Marine Fisheries 
and Biodiversity Conservation: Interaction and Coevolution (John Wiley and Sons, 2014), 
 211–224; Julien Rochette, et al, ‘Regional Oceans Governance Mechanisms: A Review’, 
(2015) 60 Marine Policy, 9–19.
29 Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W Knecht ‘The Emergence of a Regional Ocean Regime in 
the South Pacific’, (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly, 171–215, at 191; Jon M Van Dyke ‘Region-
alism, Fisheries and Environmental Challenges in the Pacific’ (2004) 6 San Diego Interna-
tional Law Journal, at 143; Lori Osmundsen, ‘Paradise Preserved-The Contribution of the 
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instruments for oceans governance at the oceanscape scale as they relate to 
the pic campaign for an Ocean sdg.
IV Oceanscape Scale Governance
In 2002, the sixteen independent and self-governing states in Oceania of the 
 Forum endorsed the Pacific Island Regional Ocean Policy (pirop).30 The 
pirop forms the central reference for the establishment of regional positions 
in international oceans governance and its implementing framework aims to 
maintain the health of the ocean using an integrated transboundary approach 
through the harmonization of international and regional instruments and in-
stitutions.31 The subsequent Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape (fpo)32 pro-
vides a renewed effort to implement the pirop, and was designed to address 
the institutional challenges experienced in the coordination of regional ocean 
governance.33
Regional oceans governance aspires to address the cumbersome nature of 
global governance while encompassing a sufficient scale of ecological ocean 
processes for governance interventions to be meaningful for ecosystem func-
tion. The strong political commitment from pic leaders for the pirop make 
it a powerful instrument as does both the scale of its oceans coverage and its 
principle to preserve ecosystem integrity as driven by regional-scale ecosystem 
processes.34 This legal/ecological accordance is a quality envisioned for effec-
tive international oceans law as early as 1925.35
uneps Regional Seas Programme in an example of one of the first en-
deavours to align governance at the scale of the ocean ecosystem. Young et al 
sprep Convention to the Environmental Welfare of the South Pacific’ (1992) 19:4 Ecology 
Law Quarterly, 727–793, at 780.
30 pifs, Forum Communique: Annex 2 Pacific Island Regional Ocean Policy (33rd Pacific 
 Islands Forum, Fiji, 15–17 August 2002), at 12–18.
31 pifs, Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy and the Framework for Integrated Strategic 
 Action (Noumea: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005), at 3.
32 pifs, Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape (Marine Sector Working Group, Council of 
 Regional Organisations of the Pacific, 2010).
33 C Pratt and H Govan, Our Sea of Islands, Our livelihoods, Our Oceania: Framework for a 
Pacific Oceanscape: A Catalyst for Implementation of Ocean Policy (Report prepared for the 
crop Marine Sector Working Group, 2010).
34 pifs, supra note 35, at 6.
35 J Suarez, ‘Report on the Exploitation of Products of the Sea’, in Shabtai Rosenne (ed) 
League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International 
Law (1925–1928), Vol 2 (Oceana Publications, 1972), 146–152, at 147.
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consider the large-scale spatial management of marine ecosystems crucial to 
the ecological crisis confronting our oceans.36 Telesetsky envisions the use of 
‘ecoscape thinking’ citing scale as a critical element to successful governance 
and restoration of marine ecosystems.37 The pirop and fpo significantly 
broaden the scale envisaged by these authors from large marine ecosystems to 
the ‘oceanscape’. Yet as policy frameworks for regional coordination the pirop 
and fpo only somewhat address the need for a precise and robust correspond-
ing legal instrument for large-scale oceans governance.38
In section ii we examined how the historical motivations behind regional 
solidarity for oceans governance have been a central driver for cooperation 
and coordination between pics. Regional-scale governance of transboundary 
marine natural resources, however, retains the challenges of the accountabil-
ity39 and legitimacy40 inherent to agency beyond the state41 yet is increasingly 
popular for both environment and development donors.42 In Oceania the 
complex institutional framework for oceans governance43 is of consequence 
for the governability of ocean resources at this scale. Questions raised on 
36 Oran R Young, et al, ‘Solving the Crisis in Ocean Governance: Place-Based Management of 
Marine Ecosystems’, (2007) 49:4 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Develop-
ment, 20–32.
37 Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘Restoration and Large Marine Ecosystems: Strengthening Gover-
nance for An Emerging International Regime Based on Ecoscape Management’, (2013) 35 
University of Hawai’i Law Review, at 735.
38 Wang Hanling, ‘Ecosystem Management and Its Application to Large Marine Ecosystems: 
Science, Law and Politics’, (2004) 35:1 Ocean Development & International Law, at 60; Mar-
tin H Belsky, ‘Management of Large Marine Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of Cus-
tomary International Law’, (1985) 22 San Diego Law Review, 733–763.
39 Juan L Suárez de Vivero, Juan C Rodríguez Mateos, and David Florido del Corral, ‘Geo-
political Factors of Maritime Policies and Marine Spatial Planning: State, Regions and 
Geographical Planning Scope’, (2009) 33:4 Marine Policy, 624–634.
40 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge 
for International Environmental Law?’, (1999) American Journal of International Law. 
596–624.
41 Frank Biermann, ‘”Earth System Governance” As a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change 
Research’, (2007) 17:3 Global Environmental Change, 326–337.
42 Robin Mahon, et al, ‘Governance Characteristics of Large Marine Ecosystems’, (2010) 34:5 
Marine Policy, 919–927; Pedro Fidelman, et al, ‘Governing Large-Scale Marine Commons: 
Contextual Challenges in the Coral Triangle’, (2012) 36:1 Marine Policy, 42–53.
43 Andrew Wright, Natasha Stacey and Paula Holland ‘The Cooperative Framework for 
Ocean and Coastal Management in the Pacific Islands: Effectiveness, Constraints and 
 Future Direction’, (2006) 49:9 Ocean & Coastal Management, 739–763, at 744.
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governability of marine systems at large scales44 also implicate the prudence of 
directing funding resources and capacity building for governance at this scale.
Giraud-Kinley, Chasek and Osmundsen provide rigorous critiques of the 
challenges of implementing multilateral environmental agreements with 
 existing Pacific institutional architecture, capacity and resources.45 Tutangata 
and Power highlight the importance of the inter-agency collaboration under 
the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific in maintaining a function-
al framework for the coordination of diverse institutions.46 The Marine Sector 
Working Group is responsible for this coordination between those agencies 
with a mandate for oceans governance.
The implementation of the fpo established the Pacific Ocean  Commissioner 
(poc) to improve high-level representation and provide dedicated advocacy on 
oceans issues for the region. The poc is supported by the Office of the  Pacific 
Ocean Commissioner, which is gaining recognition for its role in improving 
coordination on regional oceans governance issues with the multiple agencies 
with an oceans mandate through the mswg. The success of this coordination 
of regional ocean issues is manifest in the clear mandate for a stand-alone 
Ocean sdg from the region to United Nations Ambassadors and Permanent 
Representatives to the un.47 The unsg recognised the Pacific Forum leaders 
as ocean stewards and commended the Forum campaign for an Ocean sdg.48
Manoa documents the rise of the Pacific sids as the primary advocacy 
group at the un for pics.49 A finding supported in Gruby and Campbell’s 
analysis of pic global environmental governance negotiations.50 Manoa’s 
44 Svein Jentoft, ‘Limits of Governability: Institutional Implications for Fisheries and Coastal 
Governance’, (2007) 31:4 Marine Policy, 360–370.
45 Robin Mahon, et al, ‘Governance Characteristics of Large Marine Ecosystems’, (2010) 34:5 
Marine Policy, 919–927; Pamela S Chasek, ‘Confronting Environmental Treaty Implemen-
tation Challenges in the Pacific Islands’ (Pacific Island Policy East-West Center, 2010); Lori 
Osmundsen, ‘Paradise Preserved-The Contribution of the sprep Convention to the Envi-
ronmental Welfare of the South Pacific’, (1992) 19:4 Ecology Law Quarterly, 727–793.
46 Tamari’i Tutangata and Mary Power, ‘The Regional Scale of Ocean Governance Regional 
Cooperation in the Pacific Islands’, (2002) 45:11 Ocean & Coastal Management, 873–884.
47 pifsa ‘Forum Communiqué, Annex B Palau Declaration on “The Ocean: Life and Future”: 
Charting a Course to Sustainability’ (45th Pacific Island Forum, Koror, 29–31 July 2014), at 2.
48 United Nations, Secretary General, Secretary-General’s Remarks at Meeting with Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders, 26 September 2014, at 1.
49 Fulori Monoa, ‘The New Pacific Diplomacy at the United Nations: The Rise of the psids’. 
in G Fry and S Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy (anu Press, 2016), 213–234, at 233.
50 Rebecca Gruby and Lisa Campbell, ‘Scalar Politics and the Region: Strategies for Tran-
scending Pacific Island Smallness on a Global Environmental Governance Stage’, (2009) 
45:9 Environment and Planning A, 2046–2063, at 2060.
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analysis defines the operation of the Pacific sids group at the un distinct from 
 Forum members Australia and New Zealand. She cites differing interests with 
Australia and New Zealand as one of the reasons for the pics’ collective advo-
cacy at the un along with the benefits of collaborative working arrangements 
to address the resourcing and capacity challenges of Pacific Island missions 
to the un. In this article we have shown the solidarity between Forum mem-
bers for a common oceans governance framework and focus on the interven-
tions of Pacific Island Countries from within the Forum group (excluding 
Australia and New Zealand). In section vi we chart the efforts of advocacy for an 
Ocean sdg as a uniquely pics campaign which supports Manoa’s assertion of 
Pacific sids as the pics primary advocacy grouping. We substantiate this claim 
with evidence of the operation of the Pacific sids as a discrete group from the 
un sids in the Ocean sdg campaign to the un.
The continuing focus by pics on global ocean issues at the un signals an 
investment and commitment to the future of collective ocean diplomacy for 
the pics. For example, the region will begin a training program in January 2016, 
the un Pacific sids Fellowships on the Ocean and Seas, which is intended to 
train a new generation of pic delegates at the un.51 Similarly, the region will 
subsequently host the 2017 High-level United Nations Conference to Sup-
port the  Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Conserve and 
 Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable De-
velopment) to coincide with World Oceans Day.52 The Conference provides a 
significant platform to showcase oceans governance by the Pacific at this con-
ference on accountability for the delivery of Goal 14.
V Power Asymmetries with External States
A stand-alone Ocean sdg could provide the pics with a mechanism to 
strengthen their sovereignty and control over marine natural resources. 
Sovereignty and control could be strengthened through global commitments 
51 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement by Dr T Suka Mangisi, Deputy Permanent 
Representative and Charge d’ Affaires ai, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Tonga to the 
United Nations, Chair of the Pacific Island Developing States (psids) on Agenda Item 82: 
United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider 
Appreciation of International Law at the Sixth Committee of the 70th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (23 October 2015), at 2.
52 United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Conference to Support the Implementa-
tion of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas 
and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development, A/C.2/70/l.3/Rev.1 (2 December 2015).
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to restore marine biodiversity, constrain exploitation, maintain  productivity, 
sustain pic livelihoods and retain the value of territorial marine natural 
 resources for emerging pic trade initiatives. It is recognized here that inter-
national duties for environmental protection themselves can also limit sover-
eign rights over natural resources – to which targets under an ocean sdg could 
contribute. The Pacific tuna fishery highlights the importance of a universal 
development agenda for the transnational challenge of managing shared natu-
ral resources under the sdgs.
Control over healthy marine natural resources remains pivotal to the em-
powerment and economic development of pics.53 Oceania is the source for 
over 60 percent of the world’s tuna catch sustaining a $us5.8 billion fishery.54 
Most of the fishing is undertaken by foreign industrial fishing vessels whose 
fishing access fees provide 10–60 percent of all government revenue for six 
pics and less for those countries with more diversified economies.55 Even so 
the industrial fishing fleets from outside Oceania return a small fraction of the 
financial benefits to the source countries.56
Development opportunities from these marine resources are dependent on 
pic’s ability to secure and administer allocation to their marine resources un-
der regional institutions. States involved in the tuna fishery are deadlocked on 
the fisheries access allocation system as pics resist efforts to reopen allocation 
discussions, which could undermine the progress on their allocated proportion 
of the catch57 and potentially erode their sovereign rights over marine natural 
resources. The ideal and promise of sovereign powers ‘on equal terms’58 is not 
53 Transform Aqorau, ‘Moving Towards a Rights-Based Fisheries Management Regime for 
the Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2007) 22:1 The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 125–142.
54 Peter Williams and Peter Terawasi, Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean, Including Economic Conditions, 2014 Scientific Committee Eleventh Regu-
lar Session Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, wcpfc-sc11–2014/gn wp-1 Rev 1 
(28 July 2015), at 2.
55 Secretariat of the Pacific Community, ‘Pacific Island Communities and Climate Change’, 
(2014) 24 Policy Briefing, 1–5, at 1.
56 Fulitua Siaosi, et al, ‘Fisheries development strategy for developing Pacific Island Coun-
tries: Case study of Tuvalu’, (2012) 66 Ocean & Coastal Management, at 29.
57 Hannah Parris and Alex Lee, ‘Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific Fisher-
ies Commission and Implications for Pacific Island States’, in Quentin Hanich and Martin 
Tsamenyi (eds), Navigating Pacific Tuna Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (University of Wollongong, 2009), 250–283, at 250.
58 Pahuja Sundhya, Decolonizing International Law: Development Economic Growth and the 
Politics of Universality (Cambridge Press, 2011), at 135.
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reflected in pics’ ability to profit from the reallocation of fishing rights under 
the losc.59
In response, a sub-regional group, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement,60 
aimed to secure greater economic benefits from tuna exploitation by co- 
ordinating and harmonising access conditions to their exclusive economic 
zones (eezs). They used a novel arrangement to extend their licensing condi-
tions from member eezs into the high seas.61 By limiting fishing in the high 
seas  these States improved their control over the spatial distribution of fish-
ing effort within their eezs and enhanced their sovereign rights over marine 
resources.
VI Analysis of the pic Ocean sdg Campaign
In this section we analyse the diplomatic efforts by pics for improved oceans 
governance in their campaign to secure a stand-alone Ocean sdg. We follow 
the pic interventions made at official multilateral fora relevant to the United 
Nations post-2015 development agenda chronologically between 2012–2015. 
We critically evaluate the contribution of the pic campaign during the post-
2015 development process to empower their collective diplomacy.
The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 2012 outcome 
document, The Future We Want, mandated an Open Working Group (owg) 
to propose sdgs to the 68th session of the unga. The pics were successful in 
their campaign at the owg, which produced a proposal with seventeen sdgs 
including a stand-alone Ocean sdg. The campaign continued in 2015 to retain 
this stand-alone Ocean sdg as Goal 14 in Agenda 2030.
In August 2012 the Pacific leaders at the Forum endorsed the annual theme 
of pics as Large Ocean Island States with a leading role in Pacific Ocean 
management. In the same month the Small Islands Developing States (sids) 
integrated an enabling cooperation framework for the Barbados Programme 
of Action and Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Pro-
gramme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing 
States. This recognised sids as lois and proposed a stand-alone Ocean sdg. 
59 Rachel Schurman, ‘Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Islands Tuna 
Industry’, (1998) 29:1 Development and Change, 107–136, at 109.
60 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common In-
terest, adopted 11 February 1982 (entered into force 4 December 1982).
61 A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms 
and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties, adopted 16 May 2008.
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This cooperation was of great significance to the pic campaign as it provided 
a larger coalition of sids in solidarity with the Pacific sids for an Ocean sdg.
The pic campaign for an Ocean sdg demonstrates how by reframing their 
sovereign space as lois the pics change firstly their perceived power as mi-
crostates and secondly better positions them to broaden negotiations from the 
terrestrial focus of the mdgs. Gruby and Campbell established how pics’ col-
lective promotion of their vast ocean scale is a successful political strategy for 
empowerment in un negotiations on global environmental governance.62 The 
campaign for a stand-alone Ocean sdg illustrates this collective  promotion on 
oceans governance in operation at the un in the post-2015 development process.
In September 2012 at the unga Inoke Kubuabola, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation of Fiji, characterized the oceans as their 
‘lifeblood’ and source of sustainable development:63
Like all islands nations, Fiji relies on the ocean and its resources as our 
economic life blood and source of sustainable development. While fish 
and other marine living resources have been vital to Fiji’s economy 
and livelihood, we believe that our efforts to explore deep sea mineral 
resources present greater potential, provided that a precautionary ap-
proach with regard to environmental sustainability is ensured.
Anote Tong, President of Kiribati, describes his country as a lois and empha-
sizes the fundamental role of the ocean to their sustainable development, the 
achievement of the mdgs, and its importance for the wellbeing of the glob-
al community. President Tong articulates the ocean as a key instrument for 
 empowerment and liberation from international welfare. He emphasises the 
vital role of the ocean ecosystem to human wellbeing and in the Pacific con-
text its important role in emancipating pics from aid dependence through the 
use of their ocean resources:64
We are a nation of water. We are a large ocean island State. We believe that 
given the right support we can achieve sustainable development through 
utilising the available resources of our vast Exclusive Economic Zone. We 
62 insert footnote
63 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement by he Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Fiji, General Debate of the 
High Level Segment of the 67th United Nations General Assembly (28 September 2012), at 2
64 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement by he Anote Tong, President of the Republic 
of Kiribati, at the General Debate of the 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(26 September 2012), at 5.
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believe that through this we can reduce our reliance on development as-
sistance. I am convinced that we may even be able to do away with devel-
opment assistance altogether, if we are provided with the  support we need 
now to develop our capacity to harvest and process our own resources (…)
Our message to the international community is that conservation of 
biodiversity and marine ecosystems in the Pacific is not only important 
to the sustainable development of Pacific peoples; it is of vital impor-
tance to the rest of the world. The international community needs to sup-
port these efforts, not as a hand-out but as an investment for this planet’s 
future generations.
A review of the role of pic Ambassadors to the United Nations demonstrated 
capacity challenges undermined the ability of these diplomats to adequately 
operate in United Nations forums and found their role was marginal in these 
processes.65 Therefore pics’ continuing work with the broader group of global 
sids and other interested States was important to realize a joint vision for an 
Ocean sdg. In 2013, the joint vision for an Ocean sdg was presented at the 
68th session of the unga, when Navinchandra Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of 
Mauritius, articulated a global vision for the future of the oceans that preserves 
health of the oceans while expanding the economic potential of the oceans 
for sids.66
To gain political support in the un for a stand-alone sdg the pics were suc-
cessful in building a broader coalition with the Alliance of Small Island States 
(aosis) recognising the imminent threat to oceans from human impacts and 
the importance of the oceans to their development.67 As Chair of aosis at the 
time un Permanent Representative for Nauru, Marlene Moses, made a state-
ment emphasising the importance of ocean health as the basis for sustainable 
development and sought international support for an sdg that would aid sids 
in realizing their aspirations in the global economy through the preservation 
and development of their own ocean resources.68 Support for an Ocean sdg 
65 K. McNamara, ‘Voices from the Margins: Pacific Ambassadors and the Geopolitics of Mar-
ginality at the United Nations’, (2009) 50:1 Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 1–12, at 10.
66 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement by Dr The Hon Navinchandra Ramgoolam, 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Mauritius, at the General Debate of the 68th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (28 September 2013), at 6–7.
67 Ahmed Sareer, Statement to the United Nations on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island 
States (aosis), at the Stocktaking Session for the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the 
post-2015 Development Agenda (19 January 2014), at 2.
68 Statement delivered by he Ambassador Marlene Moses, Permanent Representative of Nauru 
to the United Nations, Chair of Alliance of Small Island States (aosis), at the 6th Session of 
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by this broader coalition is nuanced; there is agreement that oceans should 
feature prominently under the sdgs yet hesitance to make an explicit call for 
a stand-alone Ocean sdg. The coalition asked only for the consideration of an 
ocean-themed sdg by the owg.
The owg on sdgs provided a direct opportunity for influence by the pics. 
The constituency-based system of balanced geographical representation 
on the owg included three pics: Nauru, Palau and Papua New Guinea.69 In a 
firm show of solidarity, twelve pics together with Timor Leste hosted the side 
event ‘The case for a stand-alone Sustainable Development Goal on Oceans 
and Seas: Healthy, Productive and Resilient Oceans and Seas—Prosperous and 
Resilient Peoples and Communities’ at the 8th owg on Oceans and Seas session 
on sdgs in February 2014; their efforts were supported by the Intergovernmen-
tal Oceanographic Commission of unesco and the Global Ocean Forum.70
The event was complemented by a second side event to raise the profile 
of ocean sustainability hosted by Italy and Palau ‘Healthy Oceans and Seas: 
a way forward’ together with the Sustainable Oceans Alliance and the Global 
Partnerships Forum.71 The direct outcome of these efforts was captured in the 
co-chairs’ summary of the 8th owg on Oceans and Seas session on sdgs, which 
affirmed the importance of the role of the ocean in the post-2015 era: ‘Healthy, 
productive and resilient oceans are important for poverty eradication, global 
food security, human health, climate regulation, and the creation of sustain-
able livelihoods and decent jobs’.72
The pic’s campaign for a stand-alone Ocean sdg from the owg was suc-
cessful.73 Goal 14 aims to ‘Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development’ measured by seven targets. The 
the owg-sdg on the Needs of Countries in Special Situations (sids) (10 December 2013), 
at 4.
69 United Nations, General Assembly, Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sus-
tainable Development Goals, a/67/l.48/Rev.1 (15 January 2013), at 2.
70 psids, et al, ‘Towards a Sustainable Development Goal (sdg) on Oceans and Seas: 
Healthy, Productive and Resilient Oceans and Seas – Prosperous and Resilient Peoples 
and Communities’ (Side Event to the 8th Session of the Open Working Group (owg) on 
Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs), New York, 3 February 2014), at 1–5.
71 soa, et al, ‘Healthy Oceans and Seas: A Way Forward’ (Side Event to the 8th Session of 
the Open Working Group (owg) on Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs), New York, 4 
February 2014), at 1–3.
72 owg, ‘Co-Chairs’ Summary Bullet Points for owg-8’ (8th Session of the Open Working 
Group on Sustainable Development Goals, New York, 3–7 February 2014), at 1.
73 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Open Working Group of the General 
 Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, a/68/970 (12 August 2014).
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unga subsequently decided the owg’s seventeen proposed sdgs would form 
the basis of integrating the sdgs into the post-2015 development agenda along 
with continuing inputs in the intergovernmental process.74
At the Forum Officials Committee 2014 Pre-Forum Session the pic leaders 
were focused on building support for an Ocean sdg at the subsequent United 
Nations Conference on Small Island Developing States held in Samoa in Sep-
tember 2014.75 Palau’s timely hosting of the 2014 Forum was opportune for pic 
ocean diplomacy with an annex to the formal Forum outcome document to 
improve accountability for development and ocean sustainability.76 The annex 
to the Palau Declaration on ‘The Ocean: Life and Future’ Charting a Course to 
Sustainability constitutes a unique intervention from the region to the un and 
was intended to contribute to the global effort to support a ‘comprehensive, 
effective and implementable stand-alone Oceans Sustainable Development 
Goal and to the preservation of our Pacific Ocean’.77 The unsg subsequently 
stated his full support for the Forum’s Palau Declaration that Pacific Leaders 
are the stewards of the Pacific Ocean.78
The Forum outcome document the Forum Communique itself documents 
the active campaign to the un in the post-2015 development process at the un 
and encourages and commends the work to date by pics:79
Leaders reiterated the importance of member countries playing an ac-
tive role in shaping the Post-2015 Development Agenda, particularly the 
Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs). They warmly commended and 
support the active efforts of Pacific Ambassadors/Permanent Represen-
tatives to the United Nations in New York to shape the Post-2015 Develop-
ment Agenda, particularly the Troika of Papua New Guinea, Palau and 
Nauru representing the Pacific region on the sdgs Open Working Group.
Central to the strategy is the regional solidarity for improved oceans governance 
which has strengthened the pics’ championing of an Ocean sdg in interna-
tional fora. Reflecting on the importance of solidarity, Tuvalu’s Prime  Minister 
Enele Sopoaga states that: ‘the main idea is to continue to be on the same 
74 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 66/288, a/res/68/309 
(12 September 2014), at 1.
75 Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Forum Officials Committee 2014 Pre-Forum Session, Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, 2–3 July 2014), at 1.
76 pifsa, supra note 47, at 1.
77 Ibid, at 3.
78 United Nations, Secretary General, supra note 48.
79 pifsa, supra note 47, at 3.
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 canoe and use leverage to voice our concerns, unique concerns, to the wider 
forum membership and of course to the wider international community’.80
The Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States 
broadly reflected this solidarity. The pifs Secretary General, Tuiloma Neroni 
Slade, presented the pics’ efforts for sustainable ocean development under 
the Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape and underlined the high-level com-
mitment for an Ocean sdg from the pics.81 An earlier sids interregional 
preparation meeting for the conference recognised sids as Large Ocean 
Island States and supported a stand-alone ocean sdg,82 and was referenced 
in the conference outcome document Small Island Developing States Acceler-
ated Modalities of Action (Samoa Pathway).83 However, resistance from some 
states outside Oceania to a stand-alone Ocean sdg at the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States meant the strong language that 
had typified the pic campaign was not translated into the Samoa Pathway nor 
was an explicit call for an Ocean sdg made by all sids in this outcome docu-
ment.84 This indicates that the Pacific sids form a distinct group within the 
United Nations sids in their diplomacy for an Ocean sdg.
The unga 69th session theme for the General Debate ‘Delivering on and Im-
plementing a Transformative Post-2015 Development Agenda’ marked a bold 
departure from the previous conciliatory tone of pics in their formal diplomatic 
interventions on an Ocean sdg at the unga. This is demonstrated by the strong 
statement from the President of Nauru, Baron Waqa who declared that the:85
(…) reckless actions of other Nations have severely undermined the 
 marine environment that we so depend on - from excessive greenhouse 
gas emissions that are warming the planet and turning the seas more and 
80 abc News, ‘Niue Premier Toke Talagi fed up with Pacific Islands Forum’s Smaller Island 
States group’ (27 August 2014), available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014–08–27/
niue-wants-to-leave-smaller-island-states-unit/5700370.
81 Tuiloma Neroni Slade, ‘Plenary Statement’ (Third International Conference on Small 
Island Developing States, 4 September 2014), at 1.
82 sids, ‘Small Islands Developing States (sids) Integrated and Enabling Cooperation 
Framework for the Barbados Programme of Action and Mauritius Strategy for the Further 
Implementation Outcome of the Inter-Regional Preparatory Meeting’ (Third International 
Conference on Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, 26–28 August 2013), at 15 & 29.
83 United Nations, General Assembly, Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities 
of Action (Samoa) Pathway, A/res/69/15 (15 December 2014).
84 Ibid.
85 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement Delivered by he the Honourable Baron Waqa 
mp, President of the Republic of Nauru, at the General Debate of the 69th Session of the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly (25 September 2014), at 2–3.
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more acidic, to irresponsible overfishing, to outright stealing fish in our 
waters, to dangerous pollution (the effects of which we have yet to fully 
comprehend).
All the while, some of the same countries responsible for the damage 
are also charged with assessing the wellbeing of the marine environment. 
How can we be confident that our interests will be protected? We, as a 
 developing country, are constantly facing demands for greater transpar-
ency and accountability from the same actors who downplay and some-
times even cover up their own transgressions.
Finding lasting solutions to problems like these will require more 
 resources and a level of cooperation that the international community 
has thus far not countenanced. It will also require us to look at the fail-
ings in the global order that somehow prevent countries like mine from 
accessing fair economic benefits of our own resources (…)
The current piecemeal approach - where a donor’s political interests 
determine aid priorities - may treat symptoms (for a time) but it fails 
to address the underlying disease. If we want our efforts to be successful 
over the long-term we need to build a foundation that develops global 
citizens and gives them the tools they need to succeed in a global world.’
President Waqa questioned the ability of the States responsible for environ-
mental transgressions to protect the interests of developing countries. On the 
post-2015 development agenda he voiced his country’s frustration that aid 
priorities are determined by political interests and sought a paradigm shift in 
development to support greater agency for pics to manage their own marine 
resources to achieve sustainable development.
President of Palau, Tommy E Remengesau Jr, asserted the Pacific region 
would fight for the foundation of Pacific livelihoods and continue their leader-
ship in ocean conservation. With the passion and vigour that saw him awarded 
the un’s highest environmental leadership award,86 he called for an Ocean sdg 
with realistic, transparent and measurable targets. President Remengesau Jr 
sought a transformational shift in the use of ‘earth’s natural assets’ and the man-
agement of the Ocean as a joint global asset of the international community:87
86 unep, Small Island Developing States Spotlighted in Top Global Environmental Awards, 
17 November 2014, available at http://staging.unep.org/champions/news/champions-of-
the-earth-2014-tommy-remengesau-announced.asp#sthash.EOODhO7N.dpbs.
87 United Nations, General Assembly, Statement by he Tommy E Remengesau Jr, President of 
the Republic of Palau, at the General Debate of the 69th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly (25 September 2014), at 2.
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Through our global actions, through our partnerships between develop-
ing and developed nations and between the private and public sectors, 
we can achieve transformational shifts in the way we think about the use 
of our earth’s natural assets. By recognizing the Ocean as a joint and pri-
mary asset of every citizen on our planet, we can move toward a global 
management of our Global Ocean Exclusive Economic Zone.
For Oceania, an Ocean sdg is a significant contribution to transform lives 
by departing from the terrestrial and aid for development focus of the mdgs 
and improving oceans governance for the wellbeing of the global community. 
The unsg commended their strong position for a stand-alone Ocean sdg.88 
The campaign is illustrative of a successful joint political strategy to align and 
identify with their common Ocean, position themselves as ocean leaders to 
 empower their negotiations at the un.
VII Goal 14 and Ocean Ecosystem Integrity
There is an urgent need to qualify development within our oceans’ ecologi-
cal limits. Support for defining a stand-alone Ocean sdg is manifest in the 
unique ecological and humanitarian threats posed by ocean degradation. The 
post-2015 development agenda marked a unique occasion to develop a coher-
ent system of governance to monitor and respond to these linkages.89 Agen-
da 2030’s Goal 14 provides a comprehensive list of targets to meet the stated 
goal ‘to conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources 
for sustainable development’ (see Annex i). An analysis of Goal 14 would be 
premature as the indicators for the implementation of these targets remain 
under negotiation. Instead we offer further consideration of approaches from 
existing and emerging areas of environmental law to achieve the pic aim of 
preserving ecosystem integrity.90
The pirop is underscored by the principle to preserve ecosystem integrity 
as driven by regional-scale ecosystem processes.91 However, despite existing 
88 United Nations, Secretary General, supra note 48.
89 Steven Bernstein, et al, ‘Coherent Governance, the un and the sdgs’, (2014) post2015/ 
unu-ias Policy Brief #4. Tokyo: United Nations University Institute for the Advanced 
Study of Sustainability, at 3.
90 Bridgewater, P., Kim, R.E. and Bosselmann, K., ‘Ecological Integrity: A Relevant Concept 
for International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene?’ (2015) 25:1 Yearbook of Inter-
national Environmental Law, 61–78, at 72–75.
91 For a comprehensive introduction to the concept of ecological integrity see, pifs, supra 
note 31, at 3 & 6.
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obligations under the pirop, the Ocean sdg campaign did not articulate a tar-
get to fulfil the principle for the preservation of ocean ecosystem integrity un-
der the pirop and neither does Goal 14 under Agenda 2030. Given preserving 
the ocean ecosystem is a fundamental principle of Oceania’s regional oceans 
governance framework the omission in the pic campaign for a corresponding 
target under the Ocean sdg is a lost opportunity by pics to fulfil this regional 
mandate.
Kim and Bosselmann consider protection of ecological integrity a common 
and unifying theme in international environmental law.92 Their work inte-
grates Rockstrom et al.’s science on the quantification of planetary boundar-
ies critical to a safe future for humanity.93 Kim, Bosselman and Mauerhofer 
 suggest addressing these interactions across scales, systems and sdg goals 
with an overarching goal to safeguard the ecological integrity of the earth sys-
tem.94 For the sdgs Griggs et al consider this science could provide the basis 
for a new system of governance predicated on the protection of vital planetary 
systems.95
pics show leadership for crafting a regional oceans governance framework 
to preserve the integrity of the oceanscape. This regional scale of governance is 
of importance given sub-global dynamics are critical to the ecological integrity 
of a functional earth system.96 Kim and Bosselman consider respect for plan-
etary boundaries could transform governance by legally limiting States’ be-
haviour within these natural thresholds. The sdgs, while not legally  binding, 
provided a unique opportunity for a systemic change to prevent environmen-
tal harm with ambitious goals and rigorous indicators for their achievement. 
The science on planetary boundaries provides some of the first specific and 
measurable indicators toward the achievement of the overall goal of eco-
logical  integrity.  However, Loewe explains the establishment of systems for 
92 R Kim and K Bosselmann, ‘International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: 
 Towards a Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, (2013) 2:2 Trans-
national Environmental Law, 285–309, at 286.
93 Johan Rockström, et al, ‘A Safe Operating Space for Humanity’, (2009) 461 Nature, 472–475, 
at 474.
94 R Kim, K Bosselmann, and V Mauerhofer, ‘Planetary Boundaries in Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals: Safeguarding Ecological Integrity as a Priority Goal and a Grund-
norm of International Law’ (Discussion paper at the Planetary Boundaries Initiative 
2013), at 1.
95 D Griggs, et al, ‘Sustainable Development Goals for People and Planet’, (2013) 495:7441 
Nature 305–307, at 305.
96 W Steffen, et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing 
Planet’, (2015) 347:6223 Science, 1259855 1–10, at 3.
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national accountability under the sdgs goals would likely create resistance 
from States.97
Palau produced an early draft for a stand-alone Ocean sdg ‘to Achieve 
Healthy, Productive and Resilient Oceans’.98 The draft Ocean sdg contains a 
useful structure maintaining universality, and quantifiable indicators to mea-
sure progress. The proposed justification relies, as mandated by the The Future 
We Want, on historical international commitments such as the 1992 Agenda 21: 
Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, 1992 United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development and the 2002 Johannesburg Plan 
of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. How-
ever, the sdgs are further mandated to be consistent with international law 
and build upon commitments already made,99 indicating greater scope for the 
 inclusion of binding commitments from more contemporary ocean-related 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (mea) and, fundamentally, a higher 
level of ambition. However, one of the outstanding outcomes of the Agenda 
2030 text is the paucity of references to international law.100
Goal 14 of Agenda 2030 could be improved by setting clear specific targets 
integrating global ocean commitments under international law such as the 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conser-
vation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks (unfsa)101 for precautionary limits to exploitation and spatial protec-
tion targets under the Convention on Biological Diversity.102
97 Markus Loewe, ‘Post 2015: How to Reconcile the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs) 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs)?’, German Development Institute, Brief-
ing Paper 18/2012.
98 Palau Mission to the un, ‘Toward an Ocean sdg’ (Non-Paper Prepared by the Palau 
 Mission, 17 April 2013), 1–16.
99 United Nations, General Assembly, The Future We Want, a/res/66/288 (11 September 
2012), at 47.
100 Michelle Lim, ‘Can a Systems Approach and the Sustainable Development Goals Pro-
vide A Way to Operationalise International Law for Sustainable Development to Achieve 
 Effective Earth System Governance?’ (Earth Systems Governance Conference, Canberra, 
13–16 December 2015).
101 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, adopted 4 December 1994, 2167 
unts 3 (entered into force 11 December 2001).
102 Sixth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity, cop 6 Decision vi/26 
(7–19 April 2002).
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The greatest weakness of the Agenda 2030’s Goal 14 lies in the targets that 
have no deadline associated to measure progress (see Annex i targets 14.3 and 
subtargets 14.7a and 14.7b.). Excellent guidance can be found in the eu’s  Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive and complementary criteria for  assessing the 
status of eu marine waters.103 Importantly, as a guide for the international 
sdgs, these specific and measurable indicators and targets for assessing ma-
rine ecosystems against clear targets for ecosystem health are designed for 
implementation by a diverse group of European States with a common and 
binding deadline for their achievement.
Norström et al. highlight the challenge of shifting spatial and temporal 
scales for the interdependence of social and ecological systems to establishing 
effective sdgs.104 As such traditional measures of ecosystem health may be un-
suitable indicators for forthcoming ecological challenges. For example, the ex-
isting mdg measure for biodiversity uses the iucn red list for species at risk of 
extinction, yet this list now encompasses criteria for threatened ecosystems.105 
Members of the pic coalition however did strive for more effective measures 
when Palau proposed a more ambitious indicator from the mdg measure of 
protected area coverage to a measure of fully protected marine areas.106
The Co-facilitators of Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda acknowledged that supporting mechanisms for certain 
goals may need to be rearranged or even newly created to ensure effective ac-
countability for these goals. The Pacific sids within the un system were suc-
cessful in creating a support mechanism to ensure the integrity of sdg14’s 
implementation through their advocacy for the United Nations Conference to 
Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Conserve 
and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable 
103 Directive 2008/56/ec Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 17 June 2008 
 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine Environmental 
 Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), L 164/19 (25 June 2008); Commission Deci-
sion of 1 September 2010 on Criteria and Methodological Standards on Good Environmental 
Status of Marine Waters, L 232/14 (2 September 2010).
104 Albert Norström, et al, ‘Three Necessary Conditions for Establishing Effective Sustainable 
Development Goals in the Anthropocene’, (2014) 19:3 Ecology and Society, 81–88, at 83.
105 Jon Paul Rodríguez, et al, ‘A Practical Guide to the Application of the iucn Red List of 
Ecosystems Criteria’, (2015) 370:1662 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 
20140003.
106 International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Summary of the Third Session 
of Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Post-2015 Development Agenda’, (2015) 32:16 
Earth Negotiation Bulletin.
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Development).107 The Pacific have an important role in seeing through the 
work they commenced for an Ocean sdg as the host of the un Conference on 
Oceans and Seas in 2017. 108
VIII Oceanian Ways of Seeing
The unsg highlighted our responsibility to act as planetary stewards in the 
post-2015 development process.109 This stewardship of Nature is a responsi-
bility implicit in many of the diverse indigenous cultures of the pics. Before 
colonial intervention in traditional guardianship and governance of marine 
resources, indigenous Polynesian societies operated at the oceanscape scale.110 
Among the diverse cultures within and between pics, however, traditional 
management scales were often small and locally managed.111 The scale and 
vision of the pirop and fpo however demonstrate the coordinated multilat-
eral commitment to reconcile traditional management scales with contempo-
rary ecological challenges. When referring to the fpo Johnson et al provide the 
following context for pic collaboration:112
Elsewhere, the ocean may be regarded as a barrier – isolating and sepa-
rating countries from one-another, but for the Pacific Islands, the ocean 
plays a unifying role – bringing countries together in a common purpose. 
With their strong cultural and traditional ties to the ocean, and a long-
held recognition that it is only through cooperation and collaboration 
107 Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations, Fiji Response to the Questionnaire of 
the Secretary-General on the Organizational Arrangements for State-Led Reviews at the 
 High-Level Political Forum (2015), at 2.
108 United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Conference to Support the Implementa-
tion of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas 
and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development, a/c.2/70/l.3/Rev.1 (2 December 2015).
109 United Nations, General Assembly, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transform-
ing All Lives and Protecting the Planet Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-
2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, a/69/700 (4 December 2014),
110 Pierre Leenhardt, et al, ‘The Rise of Large-Scale Marine Protected Areas: Conservation or 
Geopolitics?’, (2013) 85 Ocean & Coastal Management, 112–118, at 115.
111 R Johannes, ‘The Renaissance of Community-Based Marine Resource Management in 
Oceania and Their Demise’, (2002) 33:1 Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 317–340, 
at 317.
112 David E Johnson, et al, ‘Building the Regional Perspective: Platforms for Success’ (2014) 
24:S2 Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, 75–93, at 80.
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that their voice will be heard on the global stage, Pacific Island states are 
uniquely experienced at working collectively to address shared concerns.
Hanich and Bateman also highlight the difference in world view on the oceans 
between States noting pics are among the States who consider the ocean as a 
unifying feature that links rather than separates States.113 This way of seeing is 
important to understand the long history of collaboration and political soli-
darity that underlie their operation in the international arena.114 This suggests 
the perspective of the ocean as a dividing feature between these countries is a 
view projected from outside Oceania. This is Hau‘ofa’s thesis in his influential 
works ‘Our sea of islands’ and ‘The ocean in us’ that the oceans connect and 
empower a regional identity for the people of pics as people of a common 
home – Oceania – a sea of islands.115,116
Hau‘ofa’s thesis operated to reclaim, include and unite the ancestral ocean-
going people and more recent waves of migration to and from Oceania with 
their Pacific Ocean home as their common source of identity for solidarity. 
In his works Hau‘ofa emphasises the vastness of pict ocean territories as sig-
nificant to the empowerment of the people of Oceania. Hau’ofa’s work paral-
leled and followed endeavours in pic international relations that were actively 
pursuing these ideas in law and policy. This idea has been the backbone of pic 
diplomatic interventions on marine law and policy since efforts at unclos to 
secure a large ocean territory and regional arrangements under the losc.,117,118 
D’Arcy considers Oceanians’ reassertion of their maritime guardianship to be 
of global significance given the vast economic potential and relative health of 
Pacific marine ecosystems.119 The common Oceanian identity articulated by 
Hau’ofa provides motivation for their cooperation and political solidarity in 
oceans governance.120
113 Quentin A Hanich and Sam Bateman, ‘Maritime Security Issues in an Arc of Instability 
and Opportunity’ (2013) 9:4 Security Challenges, 87–105, at 90.
114 Michael Powles, supra note 11; David E Johnson, et al, supra note 111.
115 Epeli Hau‘ofa, ‘Our Sea of Islands’, in Vijay Naidu, Eric Waddell, and Epeli Hau‘ofa, (eds), 
A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands (School of Social and Economic Develop-
ment, The University of the South Pacific, 1993).
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IX Conclusion
The pics were successful in their campaign for the inclusion of a stand-alone 
Ocean sdg under Agenda 2030 to improve the governance of the oceans 
 essential to their development. Their campaign reshaped the terrestrial focus 
of the mdgs to enhance governance of the ocean’s vital role to human well-
being. The pics’ leadership as ocean stewards is evident in their pioneering 
regional oceans governance arrangements and active diplomatic interventions 
and coalition building for an Ocean sdg at the un.
The pics are leaders in their collaboration at the ocean scale – their pirop 
and fpo are innovative in their accord between the jurisdictional scale of the 
governance system and the ecosystems they govern. The pic campaign is a 
regional effort to meet the transnational challenge of managing global marine 
resources, like the Pacific tuna fishery, under Agenda 2030. While globalization 
has contributed to the erosion of pics’ sovereign rights to safeguard their ma-
rine resources, the Ocean sdg has the potential to empower pics’ governance 
of their marine natural resources and alleviate aspects of their deprivation. We 
have shown that improving oceans governance is also considered a key instru-
ment for their empowerment and liberation from development dependence.
The pic campaign for a stand-alone Ocean sdg at the un provides evidence 
of a coordinated and effective regional foreign policy for improved oceans gov-
ernance. Their strategy reframes perceptions of pics by powers outside their 
region through their empowering re-identification from sids to lois. We 
show how the Pacific Ocean is viewed as a unifying feature that motivates the 
political solidarity between pics for the stewardship of their common ocean.
In this article we have demonstrated how advocacy by pics at the un for 
the Ocean sdg operates within their natural alliances with sids and Forum 
members yet forms a distinctly strong position. The campaign represents a 
strengthening of collective diplomacy on ocean issues that we propose forms 
a distinctive brand of ocean diplomacy. The successful legacy of this collective 
oceans diplomacy depends on their solidarity and credibility through contin-
ued leadership in global oceans governance to empower their negotiations at 
the un.
Quirk and Hanich
asia-pacific journal of ocean law and policy 1 (2016) 68-95
<UN>
94
 annex i: The Text of Goal 14 in Transforming Our World: The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources 
for sustainable development
14.1 By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in 
particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutri-
ent pollution
14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems 
to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their re-
silience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy 
and productive oceans
14.3 Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including 
through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels
14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and im-
plement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks 
in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum 
sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics
14.5 By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consist-
ent with national and international law and based on the best available 
scientific information
14.6 By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute 
to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to 
 illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing 
new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special 
and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries 
should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries sub-
sidies negotiation
14.7 By 2030, increase the economic benefits to Small Island developing 
States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine 
resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aqua-
culture and tourism
14.a Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer 
marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceano-
graphic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine 
Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contri-
bution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, 
in particular small island developing States and least developed countries
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14.b Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and 
markets
14.c Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their 
 resources by implementing international law as reflected in unclos, 
which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable 
use of oceans and their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of The 
 Future We Want.
